No. 96-568

The Question Before the Court

Are same-sex sexual harassment claims actionable under Title VII?

Background

Facts:

Joseph Oncale worked for Sundowner Offshore Services on a Chevron U.S.A oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico from August to November 1991. John Lyons was Oncale’s supervisor; Danny Pippen and Brandon Johnson were Oncale’s co-workers. Oncale was forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions by Lyons, Pippen and Johnson in the presence of the rest of the crew. For example, Lyons placed his penis on Oncale’s neck on one occasion and on his arm on another occasion. Lyons also forcefully pushed a bar of soap into Oncale’s anus while Pippen restrained Oncale as he was showering on Sundowner premises. Lyons threatened Oncale with rape.

Oncale complained to supervisory personnel but no remedial action was taken. In fact, Oncale was told by Sundowner’s Safety Compliance Clerk, Valent Hohen, that Lyons and Pippen picked on him too, calling him a name that suggested homosexuality. Oncale finally quit, requesting that his pink slip indicate that he voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and verbal abuse. During his deposition, Oncale stated: “I felt that if I didn’t leave my job, that I would be raped or forced to have sex.”

Lower Courts:

Joseph Oncale filed a Title VII action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants relying on a 1994 Fifth Circuit decision that harassment by a male supervisor of a male subordinate does not state a Title VII claim. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Oncale filed his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and the Court granted cert.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

A unanimous Court held that Title VII, banning on-the-job sexual harassment, applies when the harasser and victim are the same sex. Justice Scalia, delivering the opinion for the Court stated: “There is no justification in Title VII’s language or the Court’s precedents for a categorical rule barring a claim of discrimination because of sex… merely because the plaintiff and defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same sex.”

The Court drew on its previous holding in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson to emphasize that Title VII “evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment.” Although same-sex harassment was not the principal evil Congress targeted with the enactment of Title VII, statutory prohibitions must also cover comparable evils. The Court rejected the notion that the harassing conduct should be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. The plaintiff must show, however, that the harasser’s conduct was not “merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted discrimination because of sex.” Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment is beyond the reach of Title VII.

In holding that conduct must reach a certain level of severity and pervasiveness before it can be deemed sexual harassment, the Court rejected the notion that recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will transform Title VII into a general civility code for the workplace. Rather, Title VII is specifically aimed at preventing discrimination because of sex, not merely conduct “tinged with offensive connotations.” The Court said: “the statute does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same and of the opposite sex…[t]he objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances.”

 
The Importance of this Case

As the first case in which the Supreme Court has ruled on same-sex harassment in the workplace, Oncale decisively reaffirms and strengthens the Court’s prior holdings in the sexual harassment context. A decade ago, in Meritor, the Court recognized that unwelcome sexual conduct in the workplace—demanding quid pro quo or creating a hostile work environment—is prohibited by Title VII because it discriminates or creates an adverse condition of employment on the basis of sex. With its decision in Oncale, the Court acknowledges that neither men nor women need endure sexual harassment in the workplace, regardless of the sex of the harasser.

The Court clarified the threshold that conduct must cross to be considered sexual harassment: “The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.” The Court reiterated that to constitute sexual harassment, the conduct must (1) discriminate because of sex, and (2) affect the terms and conditions of employment. As a result, only conduct that creates a hostile or abusive working environment is actionable under Title VII.

The Court further explained that the conduct must be viewed in the social context in which it occurs. Sensitivity to social context will enable courts to distinguish between simple teasing and roughhousing and conduct which a reasonable person would find abusive.